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ABSTRACT 
Optimal registration fees for students of diverse income 
classes is considered. A numerical example suggests that the 
efficiency of the University of Nairobi, as measured by enrollment of 
qualified students, may be significantly increased given a change in 
admissions policy. 
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1. Introduction; 
Educational institutions are often faced with an excess of 
qualified candidates who are frustrated in their attempts to secure 
limited enrollment space. In. developing countries where the existing • • 
tax base is gerally insuffient to underwrite expenditures to eliminate 
this excess-demand,, what pricing policy will insure that available 
resource? will enable the greatest number of students to be educated? 
This paper examines optimal pricing policy when candidates can 
be differentiated into separate demand groups, e.g., regional origin, income 
classes. The objective here is to maximize enrollment subject to the 
constrainingrdemand--groups and an overall budget subsidy applicable to the 
educational institution. Section II treats the problem mathematically 
while Section III presents a numerical example. Section IV interprets the 
results in light of actual behavior of educational institutions. 
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2. Mathematical Formulation 
The problem facing the educational institution is to set 
prices P^ for enrollment for i=l, . ... ,n demand groups whose demand 
functions-are given by 
(2.1) P.. := d. (X. ) for all i=l, ,n . i l l 
In equation (2.1) X^ for all i'1!,.... ,n is the amount of 
people who will enter the educational institution when charged P^. 
Clearly X^ >_ 0. It is assumed that 
(2.2) 3d. . 
, • 3 x 7 < 0 a n d l 
d^ is convex for all i=l,....,n. Equation (2,2) is guaranteed if the 
demand functions- are- constructed by rank ordering, according to willingness 
to pay. • 
Moreover the educational institution operates under an overall 
fiscal deficit allocation S and a total cost curve of educational n 
expenditures C(E X.) which is also convex; the marginal cost of educating • _ 1 
1=1 
student is not a decreasing function of the number of students in the 
relevant range. 
The educational institutions problem is therefore 
T} 
(2.3) Maximise E X. 
i<=l 1 
Subject to 
Pi " di(Xi} f o r a 1 1 i = 1' »n-
n n 
S + Z P.X.>C(£ X.) . _-, i i— . . I i-i i=l 
X.>0 1— for all i=l,....,n. 
The Lagrangian of (2.3) is therefore: 
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(2.4) £(X1,. . . • aXn5Pl3... ,Pn,AlS • • • •, V V 
n n • 
= Z X. + Z A./ d.(X.)-P. / . . 1 . . 1— i 1 1— 
1=1 1=1 
n n 
+A„/ S + Z P.X. - C(Z X.) /. S- ._, 1 1 i — 
1=1 1=1 
Assuming an interior solution (X^>0 for all i=l.,. ...,n; 
this is necessary to insure optimal pricing under relevant demand 
groups) the necessary first order conditions are: 
3d. 
(2.5) 3£ = 1 + A. — - + A P. - 2C _ . - .. . _ i S i tttt - 0 ror all 1 = 1 n . OA. iX. 
3X. 1 1 l 
(2.6) 3£=- A. + A„X. = 0 for all i=l, n. 
3P. 1 S 1 i 
(2.7) 3£ = d.(X.) - P. = 0 for all i=l,...n. 
3A. 1 1 1 l n n 
(2.8) 2£ = S + Z P.X. - C(Z X.) = 0. 
2Ag i=l 1 1 i=l 1 
Equation (2.8) states that it is optimal to spend all 
resources, both subsidy and revenues obtained from enrollment. Equations 
(2.7) state that it is optimal to charge each demand group according 
to its demand'curve. Specifically it is.never optimal to have excessive 
demand or excessive- price.. Ag is the marginal value of educational 
services which ideally should be set .equal to the marginal value'society 
receives from educating the student. In a developing country the tax; 
base may be insuffient to achieve the desired value of A . u 
J 
Equations (2.6) imply 
(2.9) A. = A„X. for all i=l, ,n. i S i 
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Substituting into equations (2.5): 
3d. 
(2.10) 1 + A ^ + XSP. - 3C = Q f o r a l l i = l s > > f n < 
1 O A . 1 
Rearranging 
3d. 
(2.11) X. — ^ + P. = 2C - 1 for all i=l,...,n. x 3X i Tx-_ 
x 
XS 
From equations (2.11) we conclude that optimal pricing 
policy implies: 
(2.12) X . — + P. = X. —3- + Pj a 1 1 irf. 
13X. 1 3 3X. i 3 
As a direct result of equations (2.12) a best 
pricing policy is a single constant price iff 
(2.13) 3d. 1 
ax . 
— ± x. j 
X^ = 3d.. for all i,j=l ,n;ji f j. 
3 X 7 l 
A sufficient condition for this to be true is that all demand curves 
be horizontal translations; this being empirically unlikely. Normally 
an equal pricing policy will be suboptimal. The more distinct demand groups 
the more divergent an optimal pricing policy will be from a uniform 
price and the greater the enrollment. 
3. Numerical Example 
Consider the possibility of price differentiation when students 
can be divided into two broad income classification; the rich and the not-
2.) Thus it is never optimal, to have an excess of qualified candidates 
who are frustrated in securing enrollment space. 
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2 so-rich. The rich have a demand function which can be approximated in 
the relevant range by 
(3.1) P, = -X t 1400, 1 1 
whereas the not-so-rich have a demand function which can be approximated 
in the relevant range by 
(3.2) P2 = -600. 
The cost function is linear and given by 
(3.3) C(E X.) = 100 + 500(1 X.). 
Overall subsidy given by the government is given by 
(3.4) S = 2,300,100. 
The maximization problem facing the educational 
institution is therefore to: 
(3.5) Maximize X + X2 
subject to 
P = -X1 + 1400 
P 2 = - 6 0 0 
2,300,100 + P X + P2X2>100 + 500(X1 + X,). 
2. Numbers chosen for this example are roughly representative 
of the situation at the University of Nairobi. As such numerical 
quantities should be interpreted as monthly allocations in terms of 
shillings. The objective function of the maximization problem should 
be interpreted as enrollment of new freshmen students. 
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The necessary first order conditions are: 
3d Sd2 
(3.6) X. — i + P1 = X 2 ~ - + P2 
1 3X, 2 
(3.7) P2 = -600. 
(3.8) ' P1 = ~X1 + 1 4 0 0• 
(3.9) 2,300,100 + P X + P2X2 = 100 + 500(X1 +X2). 
Solving we obtain: 
(3.10) P, = 400. 
(3.11) X = 1000. 
(3.12) P2 = -600. 
(3.13) X2 =2000. 
with total output X* given by 
(3.14) X* = X + X2 = 3000 students 
This optimal enrollment level should be compared with a 
single price enrollment scheme. Suppose that the single price is a per 
student subsidy of K.shs. 600 per month. The enrollment can be 
calculated directly from the budget constraint: 
(3.15) S - 600X = 100 + 500X. 
This implies .. ...... 
• ' ' X 2091 students.3 
3. This corresponds to an average annual expenditure of 
about K.Shs. 13,200 per student; not an unrealistic estimate in 
the University of Nairobi case. 
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If this numerical example can be viewed as representative then 
even differentiation into but two distinct income groups of students 
can increase the efficiency of the educational institution; in the 
example given almost a fifty per cent gain is realized. If students are 
divided into even finer classifications (as, for example, by parental 
income tax bracket) even greater gains might be obtained. 
4. Conclusions 
As shown in Section 3 the gains from price differentiation 
in relation to one of an educational institution's objectives is likely 
to be substantial. This gain can in part be utilized to explain the 
behavior of many educational institutions where the parents of candidates 
for scholarships must file a confidential statement of their assets 
before acceptance to a university. Such behavior is much closer to 
optimal than a single pricing mechanism. This analysis introduces the 
specific optimality conditions which should be met under such systems. 
In developing countries, such as Kenya, where educational 
resources are less than desired arising from the existence of a small 
industrial sector and therefore a small tax base, among other reasons, 
a single pricing policy can be viewed as a definite detriment to long 
run growth and progress. 
